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Abstract: 
 
Serbia had, when started its process of European integration in 2000, relatively 
high level of external debt amounting to 132% of GDP. All liabilities were 
practically inherited Government external debt since private sector during the 
period before 2000 even did not have the opportunity to take credits abroad. After 
the regime was changed, significant part of the liabilities was written off. In that 
position, country was thirsty for new capital resources and private sector 
indebtedness rise was not surprising. Moreover, it was one of the preconditions 
for future economic development. Even Central Government was in position to 
take credits under relatively favourable conditions in order to finance 
infrastructure projects and support structural economic reforms. Unfortunately, 
after ten years of transition structural reforms did not performed and external 
debt continued to increase dynamically reaching at the end of 2010 disturbing 
84.9% of GDP and 236.2% of total annual export. After the slight stagnation 
during the crisis, external debt continued its rise dominantly as a consequence of 
rising Government debt. Current situation should attract the attention of the 
economic policy makers. Further external debt increase may jeopardize 
macroeconomic stability as well as the process of economic integration since it is 
expected that European Union will carefully observe macroeconomic situation in 
potential member states, especially after the PIGS countries phenomenon. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the political changes in 2000, Serbian external position changed 
dramatically. Country openness increased from 60% in 2002 up to 90% at the end 
of 2011, and during the 2012 reached more than 100%. From the economical 
point of view, there are at least two important implications of country’s opening 
to the rest of the world. First, Serbia was in a position to attract investments from 
other countries in order to boost economic growth and develop its economy. That 
was very important source of new capital and chance for creating new jobs and 
reducing of unemployment, typical for the first transition years, as well as one of 
the ways for export increase. Second, that was an opportunity for both 
Government and private sector to take credits in order to finance its activities. 
Openness may be problematic also, since undeveloped domestic economic 
entities have to compete with foreign subjects. The consequence may be current 
account deficit worsening that could jeopardize macroeconomic stability by 
creating many imbalances. Government mainly took credits in order to cover its 
fiscal deficits, rarely for the purpose of structural reforms. On the other hand, 
private sector lacked capital resources for investments. Rising payment balance 
deficit was only a consequence of that situation. Thanking to the openness, people 
lived better than they would if the economy stay closed and trade deficit actually 
represents a difference between Serbian citizens spending and earnings4. 
 
Our uncompetitive economy exposed to international competition was actually 
created debt rather than attracting foreign direct investments to cover balance of 
payments deficit. One of the most deteriorating effects of that deficit was external 
debt enlargement. Its dynamics refers to questionable sustainability in a long 
term, and a process of adaptation may be painful if not perceived on time. In that 
context, it is necessary to make slight difference between public and private 
sector. Despite the fact that Government is a last resort for private sector debt 
repayments, it is very indicative that after 2007 Government sector is the main 
reason for external debt increase while the private sector behave rationally and its 
debt stagnated in that period. Currently, very good sign is the fact that almost 
95% of debt is long term and its maturity is about 7 years5. However, it should be 
noted very dynamic increase in debt repayments in the last period. Annual 
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repayment in 2011 was more than 13% of GDP comparing to 7% in 2006. Only in 
2011, Serbia paid more than 4bln EUR to service its external debt obligations.  
 
In the process of EU integration, macroeconomic stability is one of the necessary 
preconditions. Serbia actively cooperates with the international financial 
institutions. Their support will be necessary in order to maintain macroeconomic 
stability. As a matter of fact, main Central Government creditors are Paris Club of 
creditors, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
European Investment Bank (EIB). They approve credits mainly for structural 
reforms or important infrastructure projects. In that way they act as kind of 
financial control. International financial institutions are important creditors in 
private sector too. EBR, IBRD and IFC together gave more than 1,3bln EUR to 
the private sector. Their presence is one of the guarantees of stable business 
environment important for future investors. Especially important is IMF 
arrangement that for example, limited Government budget deficit at 4% of GDP 
in 2010. Unfortunately, Government sometimes does not act as a responsible 
partner in a long term. By the latest Serbian Ministry of Finance data, Serbian 
budget deficit is more than 52bln RSD in the first quarter of 2012, which is more 
than half of the amount agreed by the last year budget6. The second aspect of 
relations with EU when considering external debt position is external trade. EU is 
the largest Serbian trade partner. Balance of payments problem only reflects 
Serbian weak export potentials. Since all economies that passed process of 
integrations continued to liberalize economy it is hard to expect that Serbia will 
go other way. In our case, domestic demand strengthening influenced import to 
rise rapidly. It should be quite important in the future period to make the export 
products more competitive and that will probably determine perspective of the 
Serbian economy.  
RELEVANT LITERATURE REVIEW 
By the IMF methodology, gross external debt, at any given time, is the 
outstanding amount of those actual current, and not contingent, liabilities that 
require payment of principal and/or interest by the debtor at some point and that 
are owed to non-residents by residents of an economy7. Serbia has completely 
adjusted its external debt method according to the IMF standards as of September 
2010. IMF methodology concerning external debt mainly focus on highly 
indebted low income countries having in mind that European economies, 
especially those EU members, are relatively stable concerning that issue. 
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However, there are a lot of papers covering that issue in low income countries and 
World Bank methodologies enable us to derive useful conclusions for Serbia. 
 
Our motivation to explore external debt situation in Serbia in the context of EU 
integration has strong theoretical background. Namely, many arguments 
defending sustainability of Serbian external or public debt refer to the IMF 
methodology and benchmark given as an orientation for countries how much debt 
they can afford. As we will see later, Serbia is, by these criteria, below the critical 
values of 220% debt to export ratio and 80% debt to GDP ratio. Also, when 
considering public debt burden, Serbia is below the critical value of 60% public 
debt to GDP ratio, prescribed by the Maastricht criteria. However, these critical 
values serve only as an orientation for the countries and nobody would guarantee 
that problems may arise before country achieves critical point. Moreover, some 
data lead to different conclusions. According to the Reinhart and Rogoff study, 
more than half of cessation of debt repayments in the middle income countries 
actually happened below external debt to GDP ratio of 60%8. Their argumentation 
also stressed willingness of country to repay its liabilities. Serbia is certainly not 
in a position to create conditions for its creditors. Our debt repayment will happen 
in one or another way, especially having in mind future economic integration and 
costs of eventual repayment cessation may be very painful. The opportunities 
Serbia had by its access to the international capital markets also have a different 
aspect. International capital markets may act in a disciplining way. Government 
need to take care about its reputation. As Eaton and Gersovitz stressed, 
Government will not easily decide to stop repayments if that will jeopardize its 
reputation and that is probably typical for Serbia9. Importance of joining EU as a 
source of direct investments and our main trading partner will be seriously 
threatened.  
 
Further investigations also demonstrate misleading treatment external debt has in 
domestic public discussions. "Safe" thresholds or highly debt-intolerant emerging 
markets appear to be surprisingly low, perhaps as low as 15 to 20 percent of GNP 
in many cases, and these thresholds depend heavily on the country's record of 
default and inflation10. However, the developed economies such as Italy, whose 
gross external debt in end-2009 was 120% of GDP and public debt 115%, need to 
be differed from Greece, Spain or potential member states such as Serbia. Italy’s 
net international investment position was just about -19% of GDP. So, much of 
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Italy’s interest burden is paid to Italians, and some of it is paid back to the 
Government in form of taxes. Cabral especially stresses the importance of 
differentiating external and public debt. Debt held by own citizens has less 
pernicious consequences – the interest paid is returned to the domestic economy. 
The situation with external debt is completely different, especially when it is used 
for non-productive purposes. Non-residents receive the interest on such debt, 
making the nation increasingly poor with every interest payment11.  
 
It should be stressed that not only potential default is a reason for examination of 
country’s external debt position. There are many other consequences and one of 
them is also growth. Deteriorating effects of external debt may be seen in several 
econometric studies. Reinhart and Rogoff have shown that, when gross external 
debt reaches 60 percent of GDP, annual growth declines by about two percentage 
points. For levels of external debt in excess of 90 percent of GDP, growth rates 
are roughly cut in half12. Another study performed by IMF experts refers to 
slightly different results. For a country with average indebtedness, doubling the 
debt ratio reduces growth by a third to a half percentage points. Critical points 
after debt impact becomes negative are about 160-170% of exports and 35-40% 
of GDP13.  
SERBIA’S EXTERNAL DEBT INDICATORS 
Serbian external debt was increasing in the last 10 years, basically having the 
higher average growth rate comparing to the GDP growth rates in the same 
period. At the end of 2011, external debt amounted to 24,1bln EUR. External debt 
was increasing by 9.88% annually in the period 2002-2011. On the other hand, 
GDP was increasing about 6.87% on the average in the same period, measured by 
current prices. If there was inflation included in the calculation, the average rates 
would be lower, but trend is still the same. Such a trend cannot lasts forever. 
There should be a critical point when debt will become unsustainable causing 
macroeconomic stability disturbance. More precisely, it is impossible for Serbia 
that in a long term sustains economic growth with continuously widening balance 
of payments deficit financed in that way.  
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Figure 1: GDP and External debt trend in Serbia (in mill EUR) 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
The table presented below briefly shows the Serbian external debt structure by the 
debtors in the last five years. The period chosen is the most appropriate having in 
mind that in the early 2000s the debt level actually included inherited part that 
was written off afterwards. It is evident that after first signs of crisis in the 2008, 
public sector debt continued to raise debts. The main sources were assets IMF 
provided as well Eurobonds issue in September 2011. Contrary to the 
Government, enterprises decrease its indebtedness for about 1.3 bln EUR in 
period 2008-2011. Such behaviour resulted with total private sector debt 
stagnation as well as higher share of public debt.  
 
Table 1: Serbian external debt by debtors (in mln EUR) 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
STOCK OF EXTERNAL 
DEBT (А+B) 17.138,7 21.088,4 22.487,3 23.786,4 24.125,4 
LONG-TERM DEBT 16.088,7 18.945,1 20.482,5 21.956,0 23.477,5 
Public sector 6.251,1 6.503,0 7.762,3 9.076,4 10.773,3 
NBS debt under IMF Standby 
arrangement  0,0 0,0 1.110,0 1.528,9 1.617,6 
Government obligation under 
IMF SDR allocation          0,0            0,0 422,2 449,5 459,3 
Private sector 9.837,6 12.442,1 12.720,3 12.879,6 12.704,2 
Banks 2.713,2 2.201,3 2.596,9 3.361,9 3.782,4 
Enterprises 7.124,4 10.240,8 10.123,4 9.517,6 8.921,8 
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 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SHORT-TERM DEBT 1.050,0 2.143,3 2.004,8 1.830,4 647,9 
Public sector 33,9 17,7 1,5 0,0 0,0 
Private sector 1.016,1 2.125,6 2.003,3 1.830,4 647,9 
Banks 892,3 1.322,9 1.713,1 1.730,7 581,7 
Enterprises 123,7 802,7 290,2 99,7 66,2 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
On the following graph, it is presented external debt development by the type of 
debtors, simply divided on public and private sector. After the initial years of 
transition, when considerable amount of former country inherited debt is written 
down, starting from 2006 it is rather obvious that Government sector plays very 
important role in the country’s indebtedness. It is necessary to remind that it is a 
period when privatization revenues were still coming. After 2008, another 
paradox is evident. In the crisis period, private sector start to repay its obligations 
and total private sector debt was stagnating. On the other hand, Government 
needed money to finance its expansionary fiscal policy. Privatization inflows 
dried up as well as possibilities to take credits at the domestic market that would 
probably cause crowding out effect. After the support for macroeconomic stability 
from IMF in 2009 and 2010, Government finally decided to enter the international 
financial market by issuing Eurobonds worth about 800mln EUR. International 
financial market will probably present main source of deficit financing in the 
future period.  
 
Figure 2: Public and private in external debt of Serbia (in mln EUR) 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
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On the following tables it is presented current short term and long term situation 
concerning sustainability of Serbian external position. First of all, it should be 
stressed that practically whole debt is long term by its maturity. The average 
maturity is 7 years and actually fell comparing to last years. This is encouraging 
data, although in the following years annual debt service will gradually increase. 
There are authors believing that discipline of debt result in more responsible 
Government behaviour if the debt is short term14. Debt repayment to GDP ratio in 
the last year was more than 13% and almost doubled comparing to the 2006. 
Fortunately, foreign exchange reserves are despite constant interventions on the 
foreign exchange market due to the exchange rate defending still high. Therefore, 
general liquidity position may be evaluated as satisfying. 
 
Table 2: External liquidity indicators (in %) 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
When considering solvency position, all parameters are according to the World 
Bank methodology, slightly below critical points. External debt share in GDP at 
the end first quarter of 2012 amounted up to 77.5% (80% is per World Bank 
considered as high indebtedness. As it was already mentioned, it is completely 
different when considering that ratio for low, middle or high income countries. 
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External 
liquidity 
indicators 
(in %)  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Q1 
Forex 
reserves/imports 
of goods and 
services (in 
months)  6,1 9,0 7,2 5,2 9,4 8,1 8,6 7,8 
Forex 
reserves/short-
term debt  519,2 941,7 917,5 380,8 528,8 546,4 1.860,8 1.914,1 
Forex reserves 
/GDP  24,2 38,7 33,8 25,0 36,6 35,7 38,7 35,5 
Debt 
repayment/GDP  4,7 7,0 10,1 10,6 11,5 12,3 13,1 12,1 
Debt 
repayment/exports 
of goods and 
services  17,7 23,5 33,2 34,0 39,1 33,8 35,5 33,7 
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Countries that have huge wealth stocks accumulated and deserved confidence of 
international financial institutions and Governments may afford higher debt 
levels. On the other hand, Serbia belongs to the group of middle income countries 
that are more vulnerable to the external shocks. For Serbia, reaching external debt 
share above 80% would be very dangerous in the context of potential interest 
rates increase, export decrease, or any other volatility in the foreign markets. 
Confidence Serbia got with great difficulties would be questionable. Foreign 
Governments, financial institutions and markets in general carefully observe 
solvency indicators. Country may be solvent but illiquid in the same tame and 
vice versa. Solvent but illiquid country is considerably less risky than an insolvent 
one, and financial and monetary variables should reflect this15. For the future 
investigations, it would be interesting to perform more detailed analysis whether 
Serbian economy, in the sense of economic growth, has already suffered due to 
the high debt level. Other important solvency measure, ratio of external debt to 
the annual export is also below critical level of 220%, amounting to 211% at the 
end of first quarter in 2012.  
 
Table 3: External solvency indicators (in %) 
 
External 
Solvency 
Indicators 
 (in %) 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
Q1
 
External 
debt/GDP  58,7 55,9 49,8 60,1 60,9 60,2 64,6 77,7 84,9 77,5 77,2 
Short-term 
debt/GDP 3,8 3,1 2,3 4,7 4,1 3,7 6,6 6,9 6,5 2,1 1,9 
External 
debt/exports 
of goods 
and services  
300,9 251,6 211,5 228,9 204,1 197,3 207,6 265,3 236,2 210,3 211,1 
Source: National Bank of Serbia 
 
According to the presented data it should be noted that Serbian external position 
is far from stable. Serbia will be vulnerable in the future to all external shocks as 
well as unexpected Government behaviours related to the public spending 
increase. It is necessary to perform serious sustainability projections that would 
show how much debt more we can afford. In line with that are also recently 
published documents by Fiscal Advisory of the Republic of Serbia and Ministry 
of Finance. The Economic and Fiscal Programme of the Republic of Serbia for 
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period 2012-2014 highlights that increase in spending beyond the planned 
framework would lead to a rise in consumption and dinar depreciation, as well as 
to the reduction in foreign currency reserves, along with the problems of external 
debt servicing16. Contrary to that statement, their estimation suggested that 
Serbia’s external debt in the period 2012-2014 will be increased due to the growth 
in the external debt of the public sector, while on the other hand, tendency of debt 
release of the private sector will be continued.  
COMPARISONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION PERSPECTIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF EXTERNAL 
DEBT POSITION 
The root of the external debt problems is balance of payments deficit that is 
consequence of inadequate structure of the Serbian economy. Low 
competitiveness caused weak export, while import as a consequence of country 
opening to the world, was constantly increasing in the last decade. Openness rise 
was a rule for all other countries in their integration processes. It would be hardly 
to believe that Serbian experience will be different.  
 
However, there is no country in the region with such a huge external balance 
deficit as Serbian. Reasons for such a situation are various. First is without any 
doubt, late start of transition and therefore late start of restructuring of devastated 
economy inherited from the period of socialism and turbulent times during the 
90s. Serbia in fact, does not have many competitive products for international 
markets. Also, country image is not on satisfying level and export level is 
certainly influenced by that. Finally, strong dinar policy is hardly without impact 
on competitiveness. There are calculations that dinar was actually 110% stronger 
in 2008 in the light of crisis, comparing to the 200017. It became stronger in the 
years of low competitiveness and low industrial activity causing trade balance 
deterioration. Some authors revealed that there is no exchange rate proper for 
Serbian export increase. For example, Tasic and Zdravkovic in the paper titled 
Long-run Exchange Rate Sensitivity of Serbian Exports and Imports suggested 
that the estimated elasticity of exports with respect to real exchange rate is about 
0.5, and the potential changes in the exchange rate policy would yield relatively 
small benefits for exporters18. In fact, it is evident that after the real depreciation 
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in 2010 and 2011, balance of payments reacted in a very favourable way. It would 
be interesting to perform similar test after new data publishing.  
 
On the following table it is represented balance of payments deficit share in GDP 
of the countries comparable to Serbia in the sense of economic integration process 
and size of economy.  
 
Table 4: Balance of payments deficit (% in GDP) 
 
Balance of  
payments deficit  
(% in GDP) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Croatia -5,26% -6,63% -7,19% -8,83% -5,18% -1,09% 
FYR Macedonia -2,54% -0,45% -7,06% -12,83% -6,73% -2,77% 
Serbia -8,76% -10,11% -17,75% -21,59% -7,22% -7,43% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -7,39% -3,36% -4,18% -5,42% -2,66% -2,74% 
Source: Eurostat 
 
A next indicator comparative indicator interesting already mentioned before is 
Government external debt to GDP ratio. On the following table it can be noticed 
that Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia have this indicator among the highest in the 
region, about 42% in GDP. High share of Government external debt in GDP is 
very important sign for international creditors concerning macroeconomic 
stability. Values above 40% are considered as high for countries in that level of 
economic development.  
 
Table 5: Government external debt to GDP in potential EU members (in %) 
 
Government external debt/GDP 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Montenegro 38,30 32,60 27,50 29 38,30 42 
Croatia 38,15 35,40 32,88 29,16 35,20 41,18 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 38,41 31,99 23,97 20,64 23,92 24,83 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 25,30 21,10 18,20 17,20 21,81 25,70 
Serbia 50,60 40,10 31,20 26,90 34,10 42,70 
Source: Eurostat 
 
There is no unambiguous conclusion about future government debt and external 
debt sustainability of Western Balkan countries. As it is well known Government 
indebtedness is also a matter of different economic policy one country aiming to 
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implement. As a matter of fact, not many European countries had external debt 
problems in the last two decades. Russia faced financial crisis in 1998, and that 
was actually the last European default episode in recent history. Central and 
Eastern European countries were under special attention in the first transition 
years since their economic policy management was questionable and economic 
structure quite vulnerable. After the transition period most of them are now EU 
members having relatively stable external position. However, it should be noted 
that public debt problems of the PIGS countries, especially Greece in its roots 
dominantly had an external component. Moreover, relations between public and 
external debt were subject of many papers so far. That should be sufficient reason 
to carefully observe situation in Western Balkan countries, especially in Serbia 
considering its external position analysis performed in this paper. In the pre-crisis 
period, before debt repayment suspension, internal public debt increase is often 
equally fast as external19. Common debt movements are probably consequence of 
procyclical fiscal policy. Our idea was to explore parameters important for the 
external debt position in several countries that become EU members in 2004 and 
2007. The parameters we decided to specially focus on are export trend, direct 
investments and net external debt since these factors may be possible signals of 
their external position strength and benchmark for Serbian economy. In every 
more detailed analysis of external position direct investments inflows should be 
included since they represent true sign how is balance of payments deficit 
covered. Some countries as Norway or Canada run current account deficits for 
many years but never face external debt problems. Others such as South Korea or 
Thailand faced serious economic problems caused by low level of imbalances. 
The main difference between mentioned countries represents FDI inflow as a 
source of deficit financing20.  
 
As we can see from the following graph, practically all observed countries 
achieved steady export growth and that is probably the main reason for their 
stability. Especially good examples are Hungary and Slovakia. Hungarian export 
had very dynamic rise amounting to 45 bln EUR in the 2003, just before country 
entered EU. Strong export was basis for country stability since irresponsible fiscal 
policy in period 2002-2010 jeopardized macroeconomic stability21. Country 
avoided serious loss of reputation despite the fact that gross government debt was 
enormously high comparing to the countries of similar economic size amounting 
to 80% of GDP at the end of last year. Slovakian experience may also be very 
useful. Thanks to the large foreign investments in automotive and electronic 
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industries, export was rising in the period 2002-2010 with the average annual 
growth rate of more than 12%. In the period before entering the EU, Serbia may 
also look at the Bulgarian experience in the process of integration. Their export 
was rising almost 15% on average in the last five years before entering the EU. 
Serbia actually had serious export growth in the last 10 years. However, external 
balance of goods and services problems lies in very high rise of import in the 
same period.  
 
 
Figure 3: Export level in comparable EU members 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
On the following figure it may be noticed that in years just before entering EU 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia had very high level of investments inflow even 
GDP had a considerably strong rise in these years. That certainly helped in 
boosting economic activity, export rise and strengthening external position. Also, 
it is rather indicative data that all countries except Latvia and Slovenia 
experienced severe investments rise in the year of accession. Estonia had dramatic 
rise in the following years while Slovenia is by mot of parameters including net 
external debt as well as public in satisfying external position.  
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Figure 4: Direct investments flow (in % GDP) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Table 6: Net external debt in % GDP in selected EU members  
 
Net 
external 
debt in % 
GDP 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bulgaria 9,5 8,5 2,5 11,3 15,5 32,7 48,9 49,6 43 32,9 
Estonia n.a. 13 17,6 18,4 27,5 35 37,6 34,5 23,4 6,5 
Latvia 20,9 24,2 29,9 35,8 44,2 49,6 57,1 58,7 53,5 45,1 
Lithuania 13,2 12,9 13,3 15,9 19,8 29,6 35,1 40,3 39,4 36 
Hungary 22,8 29 33,1 37 43 50,9 57,5 63,3 60,7 52 
Romania 10,4 13,9 8,2 8,3 11 20,9 27,7 34,6 37,9 37,4 
Slovenia n.a. n.a. -3,4 3,1 10,9 20,5 30,8 37,5 40,4 38 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Finally, net external debt measure is very important indicator of external health 
country for various reasons. In the table below it can be noticed that only Hungary 
and Latvia have little bit higher external debt position. However, Hungary by now 
had steady export rise, and that is very important factor of its sustainability.  
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As it is well known Government indebtedness is also matter of different economic 
policy and there are lots of papers proving that statement. Llorka and Redzepagic 
observed public debt in the paper titled “Debt sustainability in the EU New 
Member States: empirical evidence from a panel of eight Central and East 
European countries” and shown that despite of completely different fiscal policies 
of observed countries their budget deficits are sustainable in the long run. They 
performed their investigation on two groups of countries. First group included 
Slovenia and three Baltic countries, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, that performed 
strict fiscal policy. The other group included Visegrad group countries that have 
budget deficits exceeded the limit of 3% of GDP. Conclusion they got is quite 
encouraging for the Serbia, Croatia and similar countries: Every temporary fiscal 
deficit can be sustainable as long as it is matched by an adequate future budgetary 
surplus22. There is no unambiguous conclusion about future government debt and 
external debt sustainability of new EU members and Western Balkan countries. 
All criteria examined suggest that current situation is stable, significantly better 
comparing to Balkan countries. Every more in depth analysis of external debt 
should include sensitivity projections and variables such as public debt, interest 
rates volatility and potential external shocks.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Serbian external debt had dynamic rise in the last decade. Large part of liabilities 
to the Paris and London Club was written off as a support to the structural reforms 
in the beginning of 2000s. However after that, debt continued to rise very 
dramatically on the waves of inflated domestic demand and both private and 
public sector credits. External debt rise was a consequence of balance of 
payments deficit increase that was not covered by the sufficient direct investments 
inflow. In 2008 balance of payments deficit reached 21.6% of GDP and that is the 
highest ratio in the region by far. This increase was a result of low 
competitiveness of the economy and unfavourable exchange rate in that period.  
 
Many authors investigated external debt and balance of payments problems of 
countries similar to Serbia. It is well known conclusion that solution for this type 
of problems should only be productivity rise, export activities enhancement and 
attraction of direct investments. Government spending decrease would be helpful 
since large part of Serbian external debt is a result of Government debts increase. 
In the crisis period private sector repaid its debts while Government decided to 
finance to its budget deficit through new debts.  
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New EU members had similar problems as Serbia. They succeeded in export 
awakening and Serbia should learn from their experience. In the process of EU 
integration it is normal for every economy to increase its level of openness. 
Country openness and process of economy liberalization have to be followed by 
the export strengthening. The examples of Slovakia and Hungary may be very 
useful for Serbia.  
 
In the process of economic integration Serbia actively cooperate with 
international financial institutions. Their role is quite important due to the fact that 
they control future borrowings. In the times of financial crisis external debt 
increased as a consequence of Government procyclical economic policy. Such a 
practice cannot lasts forever since it will lead to serious macroeconomic 
imbalances. Also, it would jeopardize economic integrations and external position 
of Serbian economy. Government in that context have to react immediately by 
creating more favourable environment for investing, avoiding local currency 
appreciation, supporting export oriented companies and cutting budget deficit. 
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